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Abstract
In this paper we will look at the distribution
with which passwords are chosen. Zipf’s Law
is commonly observed in lists of chosen words.
Using password lists from four different on-
line sources, we will investigate if Zipf’s law is
a good candidate for describing the frequency
with which passwords are chosen. We look at a
number of standard statistics, used to measure
the security of password distributions, and see
if modelling the data using Zipf’s Law produces
good estimates of these statistics. We then look
at the the similarity of the password distribu-
tions from each of our sources, using guessing
as a metric. This shows that these distributions
provide effective tools for cracking passwords.
Finally, we will show how to shape the distribu-
tion of passwords in use, by occasionally asking
users to choose a different password.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate if password fre-
quency distribution can be modelled by Zipf’s
Law. Zipf’s Law is a probability distribution
where the frequency of an event is inversely pro-
portional to its rank on a frequency table. Here
the rank of the most common event is 1, the
rank of the second most common is 2, and so
on. Zipf’s Law has been observed when looking
at the frequencies with which words are used
in natural language. In our case, an event will
be the use of a particular password by a user.
To study this, we use lists of users and pass-
words from hotmail.com, flirtlife.de, computer-
bits.ie and rockyou.com. In each case, the list
of usernames and passwords were made public
after a security incident. The lists have 1800
users to 32 million users each.
There are a number of substantial differences
between the choice of passwords and the use of
words in natural language. In particular, pass-
words are usually chosen to be hard to guess
and there is a large literature of advice on how
to choose passwords (e.g. [10]). However, there
are many reasons for not choosing a password
according to the recommendations: the advice
is arduous, it takes a long time to produce a
compliant password, the resulting password is
likely to be a hash of letters and numbers that
will be hard to memorise. It has even been ar-
gued that in general, the cost of choosing one of
these passwords is far greater than the cost of
losing the information it is trying to protect [6].
Thus, rather than uniformly choosing from a
list of non-dictionary words the average user is
likely to choose a password which they can easily
remember, such as their name, city where they
live, favourite team and so on which leads to
certain passwords being used more frequently
than others. Since Zipf’s Law has been observed
in many empirical data sets, we would like to
investigate if it provides a reasonable model for
the passwords we see. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper to study if Zipf’s Law applies to
the choice of passwords.
Seeing Zipf’s Law, or any other distribution
that is skewed in favour of a number of pass-
words, has implications for security. If the right
distribution of passwords can be identified, the
cost of guessing a password can be reduced. One
naturally expects that, say, the demographic of
users of a site could be used to target an at-
tack; a website with a .ie domain is more likely
to have Irish themed passwords than a site with
a .fr domain.
Zipf’s law tells us that the number of occur-
rences of something is inversely proportional to
its rank on a frequency table, y ∼ r−s, where
s is a parameter that is close to 1. By plot-
ting our datasets and fitting a value for s, we
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will see that, while a Zipf distribution does not
fully describe our data, it provides a reasonable
model, particularly of the long tail of password
choices. The heavy-tailed distribution of pass-
word choices could be used by algorithm design-
ers to more efficiently deal with passwords, such
those described in [13].
To establish if models, such as a Zipf distri-
bution, can provide useful predictions, we use
metrics such as the guesswork [11] and Shannon
entropy. We calculate these metrics for both the
fitted model and the actual data, and compare
the results. We find that the actual metrics are
within a factor of two of those predicted by the
Zipf distribution, and that the Zipf model usu-
ally provides better predictions than a simple
uniform model.
Another important question is how much one
set of password choices tells us about password
choices in general. Consequently, we compare
the similarity of our different data sets using
guessing as a metric. We will show that by using
common passwords from one list, a speed up can
be obtained when guessing the passwords from
another list.
Finally, we introduce a technique for mak-
ing the passwords used by users more uniform.
When a user sets or resets a password, this tech-
nique probabilistically asks them to choose a dif-
ferent password. By basing this technique on
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, we can de-
sign it to produce a more uniform distribution
of passwords in use.
2 Overview of Datasets
We collected sets of passwords belonging to sites
which were previously hacked and the lists of
passwords subsequently publicly leaked. Since
the sets were gathered by different methods,
such as key-logging, network sniffing or database
dumps, the lists may only contain a random,
and possibly biased, sample of users. Our lists
are from the 2009 hotmail.com list, the 2006
flirtlife.de list, the 2009 computerbits.ie list and
the 2009 rockyou.com list.
Some of the lists also give multiple passwords
for a small number of users. In this case, we
cleaned up the sets by taking the user’s pass-
word as the last entry seen for that user, which
would hopefully correspond to a user initially
typing the wrong password and then typing the
correct one, or in the case that the password was
Site #users #pass
#pass
#users
hotmail 7300 6670 0.91
flirtlife 98930 43936 0.44
computerbits 1795 1656 0.92
rockyou 32603043 14344386 0.44
Table 1: Number of users and number of distinct
passwords seen for each site.
changed, the most recent password. We also
omitted any user with a whitespace password.
After the data was cleaned up, we produced a
table ranking passwords in order of decreasing
frequency of use by users. Table 1 shows the
number of users and the number of distinct pass-
words for each set of data. As is obvious from
the table, for smaller lists there are relatively
more unique passwords.
Table 2 summarises the top 10 passwords
in each list. We see that passwords such as
123456 and password are very common. The
most common password, “123456” accounts for
0.7% of the total passwords in the hotmail data,
3.3% in the flirtlife list and 2.0% in the rockyou
list; “password” accounts for 1.2% of the total
passwords of the computerbits list. This indi-
cates that the password distribution is skewed
in favour of some common passwords.
The demographic of the users from each list
is quite clear form the first 10 passwords of
the lists with each ccTLD. Note that the hot-
mail.com data is believed to have been collected
with phishing targeted at the Latino commu-
nity. The flirtlife list shows clear signs of users
speaking German and Turkish, and the comput-
erbits list contains place names of Irish interest.
If we look at the data from computerbits and
rockyou we see that the name of the website ap-
pears in the top ten of each list. It seems likely
that this method for choosing a password will
also be used on other sites.
By taking obvious passwords and knowing the
demographic of the users at which the site is
aimed one could build a comprehensive dictio-
nary that could be expected to cover the most
common passwords in use at a site. This implies
that users, if they are concerned about their
accounts being hacked, should use less com-
mon passwords. Even something as simple as
changing some of the characters to upper-case
or writing the word in ‘leet speak’, could be ex-
pected to move the password out of the most-
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Rank hotmail #users flirtlife #users computerbits #users rockyou #users
1 123456 48 123456 1432 password 20 123456 290729
2 123456789 15 ficken 407 computerbits 10 12345 79076
3 111111 10 12345 365 123456 7 123456789 76789
4 12345678 9 hallo 348 dublin 6 password 59462
5 tequiero 8 123456789 258 letmein 5 iloveyou 49952
6 000000 7 schatz 230 qwerty 4 princess 33291
7 alejandro 7 12345678 223 ireland 4 1234567 21725
8 sebastian 6 daniel 185 1234567 3 rockyou 20901
9 estrella 6 1234 175 liverpool 3 12345678 20553
10 1234567 6 askim 171 munster 3 abc123 16648
Table 2: Top 10 Passwords for each list
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Figure 3.1: Plot of rank vs frequency on a linear
scale
common list. These results also confirms some-
thing that system administrators have observed
empirically, that including a localised dictionary
when checking password hashes with crack will
usually increase the number of recovered pass-
words.
3 Distribution of Passwords
In this section we will look at how passwords
are distributed in our lists, and see how well
these distributions match a Zipf model. We will
be interested in the frequency fi with which we
see the ith most popular password. Where pass-
words are seen equal numbers of times, we break
the tie randomly.
Fig. 3.1 shows the rank vs. frequency of our
data plotted on a linear scale for the hotmail
list. There are a small number of passwords
with a high frequency, and many passwords with
a frequency of 1 or 2, which makes the graphs
hard to read. Instead, we plot the frequency ver-
sus rank on a log-log scale in Figure 3.2. These
graphs certainly show evidence of heavy-tailed
behaviour, with the frequency dropping much
more slowly than exponential. A Zipf distribu-
tion would appear as a straight line on a log-log
plot, where the parameter s is the negative of
the slope.
If we fit a least-squares line to this data, as
shown in Figure 3.2, we get a slope which is too
shallow because a large fraction of the points
have frequency 1 or 2, which biases the slope
towards 0. To account for this, we follow the
method in [1] and bin the data logarithmically,
as shown in Figure 3.3. Here, we sum the fre-
quency of all ranks between 2n and 2n+1−1. We
see that this gives us a slope which better fits
our data, and that the line appears a relatively
good fit. We use this binned slope as a basis for
modelling our data with a Zipf distribution.
An alternate way to view the data is to look at
the number of passwords nk that are each used
by exactly k users. We plot this in Figure 3.4 on
a log-log scale. As explained in [1], if the data
is Zipf-distributed, we expect this graph to also
be a straight line with slope −(1 + 1/s). As we
can see, we also need to bin this data before fit-
ting a line, and the result it shown in Figure 3.5.
Again, we see a line is a relatively good fit, with
the largest discrepancy appearing for computer-
bits, the smallest list. The resulting slopes are
summarised in Table 3.
We can also build a maximum liklihood esti-
mator (MLE) for a truncated Zipf distribution,
which assigns probability proportional to r−s to
passwords with rank r = 1 . . .N . The MLE for
N is just the number of passwords with non-zero
frequency and the MLE for s can be constructed
using standard techniques as described in [3].
This has the advantage of providing both esti-
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Figure 3.2: Plot of plot rank vs. frequency on
log-log scale
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Figure 3.3: Exponentially binned plot of Fig-
ure 3.2
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Figure 3.4: Plot of k vs. nk on log-log scale.
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Figure 3.5: Plot of k vs. nk, exponentially
binned on log-log scale.
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hotmail flirtlife c-bits rockyou
s 0.16 0.64 0.15 0.51
raw
s 0.44 0.69 0.45 0.78
binned
−m 2.46 1.72 2.56 1.37
raw
−m 3.07 2.32 3.10 2.23
binned
1 + 1/s 3.27 2.45 3.22 2.28
binned
Table 3: Parameters for Zipf distribution, esti-
mated by least squares fits to frequency and nk
vs. k graphs.
hotmail flirtlife c-bits rockyou
s 0.246 0.695 0.23 0.7878
MLE
s 0.009 0.001 0.02 < 0.0001
stderr
p-value < 0.01 0.57 < 0.01 < 0.01
Table 4: Parameters for Zipf distribution, esti-
mated by maximum liklihood.
mates of the standard error in s and a p-value1.
The results are shown in Table 4.
We see that the estimates for s provided by
the MLE for the flirtlife and rockyou data are
quite close to those provided by least-squares es-
timate. The MLE estimates for s for the smaller
data sets are between the binned values (around
0.45) and the raw values (around 0.15). We
see that the p-values indicate that the hotmail,
computerbits and rockyou data are unlikely to
actually be Zipf distributed. However, for the
hotmail and computerbits data the largest dis-
crepancy between the Zipf’s Law and the data
is for the first few passwords, indicating that the
tail of the data could pass for Zipf with a higher
p-value.
To summarise, we have seen that the pass-
word frequency data has heavy-tailed charac-
teristics by plotting it on a log-log plot. Both
least-squares and maximum-liklihood estimates
indicate that if Zipf distributed, the s parameter
is small. However, p-values indicate the data is
1P-values are calculated by generating samples us-
ing a Zipf with the estimated parameters, applying the
same process of sorting and estimation. We then cal-
culate the fraction which exceed the Anderson-Darling
modification of the K-S statistic of our actual data.
unlikely to be drawn exactly from Zipf’s Law.
4 Password Statistics
In this section we will look at a number of statis-
tics relevant to passwords that can be derived
from the distribution of how passwords are cho-
sen. We will look at these statistics when cal-
culated directly from our lists, and when calcu-
lated using two simple models of the lists. For
the real lists, we calculate our statistics assum-
ing the probability of the password of rank i ap-
pearing is fi/N , where fi is the frequency with
which we observed that password and N is the
total number of passwords observed.
The first model assumes password choices are
uniform over all passwords seen, i.e., if the num-
ber of passwords is N then a password is cho-
sen with probability 1/N . The second model
assumes that password choices are distributed
with a Zipf distribution, i.e., the probability of
password with rank i being used is Pi = Ki
−s,
where s is the parameter found in Section 3 and
K is a normalising constant.
Now let us consider the statistics of interest.
Some of these statistics place considerable em-
phasis on the tail of the distribution, and can
be sensitive to relatively small gaps between
the model and the data. The first statistic is
the guesswork, which is the mean number of
guesses needed to correctly guess the password
[11], when the ranked list of passwords is known,
but the exact password is not. Guesswork is
given by
G =
N∑
i=1
iPi,
where Pi is the probability of the password of
rank i.
Another strategy for guessing passwords,
given the distribution, is to try the common
passwords, but to give up when some fraction α
of the distribution has been covered. The mean
number of guesses associated with this is known
as the α-guesswork, Gα [11]. Its value is given
by
Gα =
rα∑
i=1
iPi,
where rα is the rank of the password when the
cumulative probability of being successful is at
least α. We will work with α = 0.85, so that
we cover most of the distribution, but avoid the
tail.
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The Shannon Entropy,
H = −
∑
Pi log2 Pi,
is a common measure of the number of bits of
uncertainty associated with a random variable.
While Shannon Entropy has been used as a mea-
sure of security of password and key distribu-
tions, it does not relate directly to how easy it
is to guess a password [9, 7]. Re´nyi entropy,
which is a generalization of Shannon entropy, is
given by
R = log2(
∑√
Pi)
2.
It is asymptotically related to the guessability
of a password [2, 8]. The min-Entropy is also
used as a conservative measure of password/key
security [5].
Figure 4.1 compares the guesswork statistics
for the uniform model, the real data and the
Zipf model. The three bars on the left show the
guesswork and the three on the right show the
0.85-guesswork. As expected, the guesswork es-
timates for the uniform model overestimate the
required number of guesses. A relatively small
percentage of the total number of passwords in
the hotmail.com and computerbits.ie lists are
shared. This seems to be reflected in the pre-
dictions for guesswork, where the uniform dis-
tribution provides a relatively good prediction
for hotmail and computerbits, while the Zipf
model underestimates. For flirtlife and rockyou,
shared passwords make up a larger percentage
of the total passwords, and the guesswork is far
lower than the uniform guesswork, but the Zipf
model provides better predictions, though it still
underestimates.
Figure 4.2 shows the Entropy values for the
actual data and models. Shannon Entropy is
shown on the left, min-Entropy in the middle
and Re´nyi Entropy on the right. The Uniform
model, again as expected, tends to overestimate
the Entropy. However, for the Re´nyi Entropy
both models and the data seem to give results
that are close together. The Zipf model seems
to provide relatively good approximations in all
cases.
5 The Relation between
Distributions
We have seen that while the popular passwords
in our lists have things in common (for example,
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Figure 4.1: Guesswork statistics for Uniform
model, Real data and Zipf model.
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the password 123456), they also show features
specific to the website or service. In Section 3
we also saw that all lists have a number of rel-
atively frequently used passwords followed by a
long tail of uncommon passwords. In this sec-
tion, we would like to quantify how much over-
lap there is between the passwords in these lists.
Consider the problem of guessing the pass-
word of a randomly selected user from one of
our lists. If we guess the passwords in the or-
der from most popular to least popular in that
list, then after t guesses we will have guessed the
passwords used by
C(t) =
t∑
i=1
fi,
users. If we guess one password at each trial,
guessing in this order recovers users’ passwords
as quickly as possible, and is in this sense op-
timal. Figure 5.1 shows C(t) as a solid line for
each of our datasets. The right-hand axis shows
C(t)/N , which we can interpret as the prob-
ability of successfully guessing in t guesses or
the fraction of users whose passwords have been
guessed. For example, after 100 guesses using
the hotmail data, we have recovered around 400
users’ passwords, which represents a 5% proba-
bility of success against a particular user. Since
we guess in the optimal order, other orderings
must recover fewer users and have a lower prob-
ability of success.
If we do not know the optimal order in which
to guess the passwords, we may instead guess
them in the optimal order for another reference
data set. Suppose we have a password of rank
i in the reference data set, and it has rank σ(i)
in the data set being guessed. If we guess in
the order given by the reference data set, after
t guesses, we will have guessed the passwords of
C(t||σ) =
t∑
i=1
fσ(i),
users, where we assume fσ(i) is zero if password i
is not in the list we are guessing. If the ordering
of the passwords by popularity is the same for
both lists, then this function will be C(t||σ) =
C(t), otherwise C(t||σ) ≤ C(t).
Figure 5.1 shows C(t||σ) for each of our lists,
when using each of the other lists as a reference.
Consider the situation after 1000 trial guesses.
The number of users whose passwords match
one of these 1000 guesses, C(1000||σ), can be
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seen to vary by almost an order of magnitude,
depending on the list used as a reference. Thus,
to guess passwords quickly, we would like a good
reference list.
Observe that for any list, once we have made
more than 10–100 guesses, the larger reference
lists lead to more successes than smaller refer-
ence lists. This suggests that beyond the most
popular passwords, there may be a more gen-
eral ordering of passwords that is more appar-
ent from the larger data sets. The rockyou list
is quite effective and the top one million rock-
you passwords cover close to 40% of users in the
other lists.
We can apply this directly to a password
cracking problem. In December 2010, the pass-
word database from Gawker.com was leaked.
This database did not contain plaintext pass-
words, but instead contained hashes of pass-
words using the well-known DES and Blowfish
password hashing schemes. We can use the
words in our list as guesses in an off-line crack-
ing attack against the Gawker hashes.
The Gawker dataset contained 748,090 users
potentially valid (i.e. 13 character) DES hashes.
The hashes use 3844 different salts. A simple
perl script can attempt passwords at a rate of
approximately 80,000 trials per hour per core
on a modern CPU. As the DES hash trun-
cates passwords to 8 characters, we truncate
long passwords and reaggregate our previous
lists. The number of users whose passwords
were cracked after t trials is shown in Figure 5.2.
Again, the large lists provide the fastest re-
covery of passwords, and recovers 40% of users
in less than one million trials. Even our smaller
lists do well, recovering the passwords of more
than 10,000 users in around 1,000 trials (less
than one minute of CPU time).
For comparison, in Figure 5.2 we show the
results of using a dictionary in lexical order as
list of guesses. The dictionary is based on the
contents of /usr/share/dict/ on Mac OS X,
truncated to 8 characters and sorted using the
Unix sort command. This results in a return
on effort that is substantially lower than with
ranked password lists.
Up to now, we have measured the effective-
ness of guessing passwords by counting the num-
ber of distinct users whose passwords would
have been correctly guessed after t guesses. An
alternative to this metric, is to look at the num-
ber of distinct passwords that have been cor-
rectly guessed after t guesses. In this case, we
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Figure 5.1: Number of users whose passwords
are recovered by using the password ordering
from one distribution to guess another.
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Figure 5.2: Number of users whose passwords
are cracked by using the password ordering from
different distribution on the Gawker.com pass-
word hashes.
recover either zero or one password after each
guess.
Figure 5.3 shows the results for our main lists.
The optimal rate at which we can recover pass-
words is 1 per guess, so we plot the optimal
line y = x. We see that with about 500,000–
5,000,0000 guesses we can obtain about 40%
of the passwords, except when guessing rock-
you passwords, when the other lists simply do
not have enough guesses to reach 40%. Despite
this, when guessing passwords from the rockyou
dataset, the curves for the other lists stay close
to the optimal line, showing that there is a good
return for each guess.
Figure 5.4 shows the results for guessing the
Gawker passwords, in terms of fraction of pass-
words recovered. As not all hashes have been
cracked and the hashes are salted, we do not
know the total number of distinct passwords.
However, we can upper bound the number by as-
suming that all uncracked passwords are unique.
First we note that using other password lists
to guess still provides significantly better return
than using a dictionary. Indeed, the curves stay
relatively close to the optimal line for guesses
based on the rockyou data set for between 10
and 10,000 guesses, indicating a success rate of
almost 100%. After using all 14 million pass-
words in this list, we have cracked close to
40% of the passwords. The curve for dictionary
words stays a significant distance from the op-
timal line, suggesting less than 10% of dictio-
nary words are actually used as passwords in
the Gawker data set.
In [4], the authors consider various techniques
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Figure 5.3: Number of passwords recovered by
using the password ordering from one distribu-
tion to guess another.
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Figure 5.4: Using orderings from each list to
crack Gawker password hashes.
for generating candidate passwords for guess-
ing/cracking. These techniques include dictio-
nary attacks, mangled dictionaries and Markov
generators, which can be trained on sample
passwords. They assess these techniques us-
ing the fraction of passwords recovered in three
data sets. They show that in order to recover
a substantial fraction of passwords, say 40%,
the number of required guesses is over 100 mil-
lion, unless the password-generating technique
is trained on a similar dataset.
Our results show that the use of a large set
of passwords as a source of guesses seems to of-
fer considerably better returns than these tech-
niques, being able to recover 40% of passwords
in a less than 10 million guesses. Of course, once
exhausted, a list provides no more candidate
guesses, whereas the mangling and Markov tech-
niques can theoretically yield unbounded data
sets.
6 Making Password Choices
More Uniform
We have seen that people’s choice of passwords
is quite non-uniform, leading to some passwords
appearing with a high frequency. The previous
section demonstrated one consequence of this:
a relatively small number of words can have a
high probability of matching a user’s password.
It has been relatively common practice to ban
dictionary words or common passwords (e.g. the
Twitter banned password list [14]), in an effort
to drive users away from more common pass-
words.
In fact, if password choices were uniform (over
a large set of passwords) some attacks based
on the existence of common passwords become
ineffective. Based on this, a scheme was sug-
gested in [13] which prevents uses from choos-
ing particular passwords when they become rel-
atively too popular, in an effort to reduce the
non-uniformity of the password distribution.
However, there are well-known schemes that
use the output from a random generator and
manipulate it to achieve a different distribution.
For example, the Metropolis-Hastings scheme
allows us to generate a desired distribution
P (.) by probabilistically accepting/rejecting the
steps of a Markov chain Q(., .). It has a useful
feature that the density of the desired distribu-
tion does not need to be known, as long as a
function proportional to the density is known.
The basic Metropolis-Hastings scheme is as
follows:
1. Set t← 0, choose xt.
2. Generate x′ with distribution Q(x′, xt).
3. With probability
min
(
1,
P (x′)
P (x)
Q(xt, x′)
Q(x′, xt)
)
go to step 4 (accept), otherwise return to
step 2 (reject).
4. t← t+ 1, xt ← x′.
where the terms of the sequence xt are the out-
put. Usually, the initial outputs are discarded,
to wash out the initial choice of x0 and allow
the sequence to move closer to its stationary be-
haviour. This is sometimes referred to as burn
in.
We can apply such a scheme to produce a
more uniform choice of passwords. Our de-
sired distribution P (.) will be uniform over
all passwords that users are willing to use, so
P (x′)/P (x) = 1. Next, we suppose that if a user
is asked to choose a password that they choose
it independently of previous choices with prob-
ability Q(.). Since we do not know Q(.), we will
estimate it in an online fashion, by tracking the
frequencies F (.) with which users suggest pass-
words.
This suggests the following scheme when users
select a password.
1. Choose a password x uniformly from all
previously seen passwords.
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Figure 6.1: Plot of rank vs. frequency for
users generated from rockyou dataset, with
free choices and with the Metropolis-Hastings
scheme.
2. Ask user for a new password x′.
3. Generate a uniform real number u in the
range [0, F (x′)] and then increment F (x′).
If u ≤ F (x) go to step 4 (accept), otherwise
return to step 2 (reject).
4. Accept use of x′ as password.
This scheme aims to generate a uniform distri-
bution via users’ choices using the Metropolis-
Hastings scheme. There are a few things to
note. First, by choosing x uniformly over all
seen passwords, we aim to avoid the need for a
burn-in period, because we begin with a choice
drawn from the distribution we want. Second,
the password x is never actually used, only its
frequency F (x), so we can use 0 for F (x) if the
scheme has seen no previous passwords. Finally,
the scheme learns F (.) on-line, so the more pass-
word choices it sees, the better we expect it will
be at making choices uniform.
We implemented this scheme and tested it by
choosing passwords from the rockyou dataset,
where the probability a password was selected
was proportional to its frequency in the dataset.
We generated passwords for 1,000,000 users,
with the Metropolis-Hastings scheme and, for
comparison, when users were free to choose any
password. The results are shown in Figure 6.1.
We see that with the Metropolis-Hastings
scheme, the distribution is much more uniform,
and the frequencies of the most common pass-
words have been reduced from over 1,000 to just
over 10, a reduction of more than two orders of
magnitude. One concern with this scheme is
that is may reject a user’s choice of password
many times, and frustrate the user. However,
over these trials, users are asked on average for
1.28 passwords with a variance of 0.61.
We note that this scheme has some similari-
ties to the scheme in [13]. Both schemes must
store frequency information about passwords.
To avoid storing the passwords in plain text,
one could store the frequency of hashed pass-
words. Our scheme, however, stores information
about the frequency with which users choose a
password rather than the frequency information
for passwords in use. This has some advantages
if the frequency table is stolen by an attacker,
as even if the hashes can be cracked, frequent
choices are not so commonly used because of
the Metropolis-Hastings scheme.
Rather than using a simple frequency table,
both these schemes can be implemented with
count-min sketches. This is an efficient data
structure that stores estimates of frequencies.
As described in detail in [13], there are advan-
tages to storing the information in a sketch, par-
ticularly if the sketch is stolen by an attacker.
This is because it uses multiple hash functions
with a smaller output space, leading to false-
positives if an attacker tries to identify high-
frequency passwords.
One difference in these schemes is that the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm aims to make the
whole distribution more uniform, rather than
limit the frequency of the most popular pass-
words. As we saw in Section 5 mid-ranked pass-
words, say from rank 10–1,000, are important
for increasing the success rate when guessing a
user’s password; these guesses increase the suc-
cess probability from a fraction of a percent up
to a few percent. By moderating the frequency
of these passwords, we reduce the effectiveness
of attacks that use both high- and mid-ranked
passwords.
We also note that while this scheme learns the
password frequency distribution on-line, it could
also be initialised using a known list of password
frequencies. While we chose to target a uniform
distribution, this scheme could also be combined
with a list of banned passwords (by setting the
desired frequency P (x) to be zero) or implement
a soft-ban on some passwords (by reducing P (x)
for those passwords).
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7 Discussion
We have seen that while Zipf’s law is not an
exact match, it seems to provide a passable de-
scription of the frequencies with which pass-
words are chosen. Estimates of the parameter
s are considerably less than one. While this
might be interpreted as indicating a strongly
heavy tailed behaviour, another interpretation
is that as s → 0 the distribution becomes uni-
form, which is actually desirable for passwords.
These observations may be of use to algorithm
designers, for dimensioning data structures or
even taking advantage of the relatively heavy-
tailed nature of users’ choices.
We also see that fitting a distribution provides
relatively good approximations of the Shannon
Entropy, guesswork and other statistics that are
of interest when assessing a password distribu-
tion. Using a uniform model, where all pass-
words are equally likely, provides reasonable ap-
proximations for the data sets with smaller s,
but provides a poor estimate of min-Entropy.
We have seen that demography of the user-
base choosing the passwords can be evident in
the most popular passwords, and even the name
of the website is a likely password. Some sites,
for example Twitter, have noticed this and im-
plement banned password lists [14], which in-
cludes many of the more common passwords,
including the name of the site. This also gives
weigth to the advice that administrators check-
ing the security of passwords in use at their
site using password cracking software should in-
clude custom dictionaries including locally used
terms.
The Zipf distribution decays relatively slowly,
so we expect there to be a large number of rela-
tively commonly chosen passwords. We inves-
tigated if these passwords change much from
one list to another. We see that this is the
case, and that while not optimal, larger lists pro-
vide good guidance about the ranking of pass-
words in other lists. We’ve demonstrated that
this can provide a significant speedup in guess-
ing or cracking passwords with moderate num-
bers of guesses, particularly over simple dictio-
nary attack, but also over a range of the guess-
generating techniques described in [4].
An attacker who has collected leaked pass-
words from a collection of websites has a use-
ful starting point for cracking a password. If
a hashed password is exposed, the time for an
attacker to try, say, 20 million passwords is rel-
atively small, even on a single CPU. We note
that this adds some extra weight to the advice
that reusing passwords between websites is a
risk, even if there is no way for an attacker to
identify which pairs of users are common to the
websites. This is because if just one site stores
the password in an unhashed format and that
password is leaked, then it facilitates the sub-
sequent cracking of that password on a system
where the passwords are hashed.
Banning more commonly chosen passwords
may result in a more even spread of password
in use. Interestingly, we saw that most English
dictionary words are not necessarily common
passwords: out of more than 220,000 dictio-
nary words, less than 15,000 appeared as pass-
words in the Gawker data set. We proposed a
scheme based on the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm that aims to generate more uniform pass-
word choices, without having to know a list of
common passwords in advance. A basic imple-
mentation of this is relatively straight forward,
and could be easily incorporated into a PAM
module [12].
8 Conclusion
We have seen that a Zipf distribution is a rela-
tively good match for the frequencies with which
users choose passwords. We have also seen that
the passwords found in the lists that we have
studied have relatively similar orderings. Con-
sequently, passwords from one list provide good
candidates when guessing or cracking passwords
from another list. Finally, we present a scheme
that can guide users to distribute their pass-
words more uniformly.
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